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Abstract: What are the juridical implications of Hannah Arendt’s conception of freedom as political 
rather than personal, based on action in the circumstances of plurality rather than an absence of 
interference in the context of isolated contemplation? This is not a question of mere philosophical 
speculation. According to Arendt, the experience of modern revolution, beginning in America and France 
at the end of the 18th century, marks the appearance of freedom as a worldly, political phenomenon with 
the potential to change our understanding of the constitutional foundations of authority. And yet this 
potential is betrayed due to the inability of our juridical imagination to escape two conceptual dead-ends: 
the image of law as command and the model of constitutionalism as a process of fabrication, both of 
which, in different ways, suppress our sense of political freedom by expressing constitutional foundations 
in terms of sovereign ‘absolutes’. In so doing the modern juridical imagination neglects the significance of 
two older conceptions of law, the Greek nomos and the Roman lex, neither of which depend upon such 
absolutist foundations. The Roman lex might suggest a way out of this conceptual impasse, by conceiving 
law as relational, dynamic, and intertwined with the political at its root, but in a manner captured by the 
metaphor of constitutionalism as ‘political grammar’ or ‘syntax’. 
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 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In principle, all modern constitutions begin with ‘We the People’.1 
From Arendt’s reflections on modernity an ambiguous account of the 
relationship between freedom and modern law emerges. On the one hand, the 
revolutionary events in America and France in the late eighteenth century mark 
the appearance of a strong sense of ‘political freedom’ in the world, with the 
novelty that subjects now consider themselves rulers.2 ‘We, the people’ are the 
new foundations of political and constitutional authority. We become aware of our 
constitutional potentia, the power to authorise new institutions and new basic laws; 
in Habermasian terminology, the modern state is marked by the idea that subjects 
are citizens, not merely the ‘addressees’ of law but also its ‘co-authors’. 
Exemplified in those modern revolutionary moments on either side of the 
Atlantic, Arendt suggests, is a radical sense of freedom as collective action in the 
circumstances of plurality. This signals a break with ‘the great tradition’3 of 
philosophy that had prioritised isolated contemplation over the plurality of politics 
and divorced freedom from the experience of action. And since our conception of 
law is a reflection of our self-understanding as social and political animals,4 the 
new sense of political freedom that emerges with the birth of our constitutional 
potentia also implies a shift in the modern juridical consciousness.5 
And yet, from the outset, two features of this juridical consciousness, which 
survive and are even reinforced by modern revolution, undermine our 
constitutional potentia. First, there is the puzzling persistence of a traditional 
conception of law as command, which assumes rulers and ruled, sovereign and 
subject, and an ‘absolute’ source of law’s authority (whether ‘nature’s God’, the 
‘sovereign nation’, or ‘self-evident truths’). Second, modern constitutionalism 
suggests the priority of fabrication (in the guise of constitution-making) over action 
(or constitutional politics), a hierarchy that was implicitly set in motion by the 
Platonic inauguration of ‘the tradition’.6 Although the ‘imperative’ conception of 
law combined with the turn to constitution ‘making’ or ‘fabrication’ are not solely 
                                                     
1 S. Chambers, ‘Democracy, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Legitimacy’ (2004) 11 Constellations 
153-173, 153.  
2 H. Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin, 1963), 31. 
3 For Arendt, the ‘tradition’, or what she sometimes calls the ‘great tradition’, of political philosophy 
begins with Plato and ends with Marx. See H. Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin, 1968), 
17.  
4 According to Joseph Raz, ‘[W]hat we study when we study the nature of law is the nature of our own 
self-understanding […] It is part of the self-consciousness of our society to see certain institutions as 
legal.’ See ‘Can There be a Theory of Law’ in Between Authority and Interpretation (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 31. 
And we might add, as this self-consciousness changes, so does our conception of the nature of law, even 
if, as Raz argues, the nature of law itself cannot change.  
5 I use the term ‘constitutional potentia’ in the sense of a ‘power to’ constitute and reconstitute basic laws, 
or ‘political right’, as Martin Loughlin puts it. See eg M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 
2010), 11-12.   
6 Fabrication, corresponding to ‘work’, is one of the three aspects of the vita activa in Arendt’s account of 
the human condition, alongside ‘action’ and ‘labour’.  
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responsible for the eventual loss of the revolutionary treasure, the decline of the 
public realm, and the eclipse of political freedom that Arendt traces in late 
modernity,7 they do represent for Arendt the hallmarks of an escape from politics 
and therefore from freedom itself.  
At the heart of modern constitutionalism lies this fateful ambivalence 
between the promise and collective self-consciousness of political freedom, which 
suggests an escape from ‘the tradition’, and an ideology of sovereignty and 
constitution-making that not only remains bound to ‘the tradition’ but also 
liberates it from its ancient and yet insincere prejudices against the category of 
‘fabrication’. This dilemma cannot be easily resolved because Arendt does not 
confront head-on the tension between political freedom and law or make any 
systematic attempt to uncover or develop an alternative conception of law ‘beyond 
the tradition’. The purpose of this essay is to explore this tension more 
systematically, by drawing together Arendt’s scattered remarks on the tension 
between freedom and law as it appears in the modern imagination and by 
developing her suggestion that a turn to earlier conceptions of law based on nomos 
and lex might have alleviated it. 
After presenting Arendt’s critique of the traditional understanding of 
freedom, and exploring her suggestion that the revolutionary events demonstrate 
the possibility of a genuine alternative, we examine how the tradition not only 
maintained its grip on the juridical consciousness in the guise of sovereign 
command but was actually strengthened and even ‘liberated’ by the modern 
substitution of fabrication for action. Two alternatives to the traditional imperative 
conception of law are then examined, the Roman lex and Greek nomos. Although 
both avoid the appeal to the ‘absolute’ associated with that tradition, only the 
image of law as lex challenges the priority of fabrication over action. By way of 
conclusion, a final tension that remains unresolved in the Arendtian framework is 
introduced, the tension between democratic freedom and constitutional authority. 
Put simply, how can the constitutional authority of the few be reconciled with the 
political freedom of the many? It will be argued that the image of law as lex might 
begin to suggest a way out of this conceptual impasse, by conceiving law as 
relational, dynamic, and intertwined with the political at its root, but in a manner 
captured by the metaphor of constitutionalism as ‘political grammar’ or ‘syntax’. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7 To explain fully the eclipse of political freedom and our modern ‘world alienation’ would require 
exploration of the late modern domination of the socio-economic sphere, the rise of instrumental 
rationality, and the logic of functionalism and ‘process’, culminating in the total exclusion of the public 
realm in twentieth century totalitarianism. This essay only deals with the early modern substitution of 
action in favour of fabrication and not the late modern elevation of labour over fabrication. For a 
thorough examination of these two reversals that Arendt identifies, see M.P. D’Entreves, The Political 
Philosophy of Hannah Arendt (London: Routledge, 1994).  
                  5/2011 
 
 4 
CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITION: 
ARENDT’S CONCEPTION OF POLITICAL FREEDOM 
 
Although Arendt’s work is sometimes credited with contributing to the 
prominence of ‘positive freedom’ in the lexicon of contemporary political 
philosophy, without further qualification this would be a quite misleading claim.8  
Arendt revitalises the concept of freedom in a unique manner, forging an intimate 
connection between freedom and the ‘political’ by recovering the Aristotelian 
category of praxis and by invoking those historical moments since the French and 
American revolutions when freedom has made its appearance in the world. And, 
most radically of all, not only does she disparage the modern liberal tradition for 
its role in the demise of political freedom; she extends the roots of its decline back 
to the Platonic turn which, in announcing the philosopher’s claim to rule, 
announces the priority of philosophy over politics and the safety of the 
philosopher over the action of the citizen.9 
To recover the sense of freedom in praxis – freedom to rather than freedom 
from – is to recover the activity and experience of politics. This in turn is essential 
in order to come to grips with that aspect of the human condition that makes 
politics fundamental, namely plurality, the fact that men, and not Man, live on the earth 
and inhabit the world.10 As Arendt so forcefully puts it at the outset of the Human 
Condition, ‘plurality is specifically the condition – not only the condition sine qua 
non but the condition per quam – of all political life’.11 Urging the recovery of 
political freedom is not only a reaction to the rise of homo faber and then of animal 
laborans in the modern age, to the retreat away from political action into the fields 
of science and economics and the functionalism and instrumentalism of human 
activity that this retreat entails, but a response to older, related, but more deeply 
engrained, facets of our loss of freedom.  
It is a response first to the Platonic turn towards isolated contemplation, the 
retreat from politics into philosophy represented allegorically in the parable of the 
cave that begins the ‘great tradition’ with the philosopher seeking to escape from 
the darkness of the cave and the shadowy company of his fellow men to find an 
ideal truth in solitude. It is a response, secondly, to the Christian-theological turn 
inwards, epitomised by the Calvinist doctrine of internal salvation, which suggests 
that one can suffer from total ‘unfreedom’ in the ‘external world’, and yet still be 
free. Freedom, on the contrary, must enjoy a worldly reality and be meaningfully 
experienced in action. This is no mere idealistic pipe dream for Arendt; action is at 
                                                     
8 Arendt’s understanding of freedom is not, as sometimes suggested, simply a reflection of positive as 
opposed to negative liberty in the sense described by Isaiah Berlin in his celebrated essay. For this reason, 
I use the term ‘political freedom’ rather than ‘positive freedom’.  
9 Arendt, n 3 above, 107. 
10 H. Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1958), 7. As Jerome Kohn puts it in 
the introduction to Between Past and Future, n 3 above, plurality, action, and politics are Arendt’s ‘trinity’. 
xiv.  
11 Arendt, ibid, 7. See also H. Arendt, The Promise of Politics (New York: Schoken, 2005), 93-95.  
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the foundation of the human condition. It is the most significant, because most 
distinctively human, aspect of the vita activa.  
The great tradition of philosophy as well as the entire impulse of the modern 
age is criticised as, in Arendt’s words, a ‘conscious attempt to divorce the notion 
of freedom from politics,’ and thereby ‘to arrive at a formulation through which 
one may be a slave in the world and still be free’.12 Socratic philosophy and 
Christian theology begin this divorce by elevating above all else the vita 
contemplativa, the outstanding characteristic of which is described by analogy to the 
‘motionlessness’ with which the inner eye ‘sees the shape of the model according 
to which [the craftsman] fabricates his object’.13 The modern liberal tradition 
continues to pursue this divorce by explicitly undermining action and it is only 
accelerated with the subsequent Marxian emphasis on labour (the second reversal 
in the hierarchy)14 and Engel’s transformation of politics into the ‘administration 
of things’ that prefigures modern totalitarianism.15  
Freedom in the modern liberal tradition is construed in Hobbesian terms as 
both material and personal. Based on the principle of ‘non-interference’, it is 
secured through a rational-legal framework in which the State exists only to 
protect individual interests. Over time this mutates into an obsession with 
aggregate welfare (economic ‘growth’), reflects the dominance of an instrumental 
rationality and ultimately succumbs to the ‘iron cage’ of bureaucracy. Political 
action, replaced first by homo faber in the early modern condition is ultimately 
displaced by animal labourans, leading to modern ‘world alienation’ with the rise of a 
social sphere characterised by transience and anonymity. Only foreign affairs, 
because not (yet) reduced to economic factors, ‘seems to be left as a purely 
political domain’.16 The modernist worldview thus considers politics to be 
‘concerned almost exclusively with the maintenance of life and the safeguarding of 
its interests’.17 For Arendt, on the contrary, politics is about more than ‘mere life’ 
and ‘personal interests’; it is about the world, which means a public realm that 
outlasts each and every individual.18  
Arendt traces the fate of an alternative and authentic conception of freedom 
as part of the vita activa, from the pre-Socratic Greeks, through its demise as a 
result of the ‘Christian suspicion’ of and hostility to the public realm (particularly 
in Protestant salvation), to our distrust of it in the wake of the experiences of 
                                                     
12 Arendt, n 3 above, 146. 
13 Arendt, n 10 above, 302.   
14 See note 6, above. 
15 See Arendt, n 3 above, 19. The point is made as strongly in The Human Condition, n 10 above: ‘Escape 
from the frailty of human affairs into the solidity of quiet and order,’ Arendt notes, ‘has in fact so much 
to recommend it that the greater part of political philosophy since Plato could easily be interpreted as 
various attempts to find theoretical foundations and practical ways for an escape from politics altogether’. 
222. 
16 Arendt, n 3 above, 154. See also Arendt, n 2 above, 77, viewing this as a result of Rousseau’s sovereign 
will and its sense of national unity or the unity of the ‘social’. 
17 Arendt, n 3 above, 154.  
18 ‘Courage is indispensable’ for this public realm, Arendt urges, ‘because in politics not life but the world 
is at stake’ (ibid, 155). 
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modern totalitarianism in the 20th century. The experience of totalitarianism 
seems to suggest no more than the canon of modern political theory had already 
led us towards, namely the conclusion that freedom is assured by guaranteeing a 
sphere of personal liberty rather than jointly exercised in the creation and 
maintenance of spaces for political action. 
In the urge to rescue politics from philosophy by recovering a conception of 
political freedom, Arendt therefore takes aim at the entire Western tradition. The 
category of freedom has been lost to us because the tradition prioritised a dialogue 
with the self (the ‘dialogue’ between ‘me and myself’ in the course of contemplation) 
over the dialogue with others (participation and speech in the course of action). 
The first ‘dialogue’, the inward experience of freedom, in as much as its 
significance cannot be denied, is derivative. It is only in the second dialogue, which 
comprises the field of human affairs and politics, that freedom can properly be 
recovered: 
 
[A]ction and politics, among all the capabilities and potentialities of human 
life, are the only things of which we could not even conceive without at least 
assuming that freedom exists, and we can hardly touch a single political issue 
without, implicitly or explicitly, touching upon an issue of man’s liberty […] 
The raison d’être of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action.19  
 
Freedom, for Arendt, is emphatically not a phenomenon of the ‘will’, a question of 
one’s personal freedom to choose from a set of already existing alternatives, ‘x, y 
or z’. It is not about being able to manage our own strategic choices, selecting the 
most efficient means to ends that are predetermined. It is not even about being 
able to choose our ultimate goals or the absence of interference (or domination) 
by others in this choice and the means to pursue it.  It is the freedom to ‘call 
something into being which did not exist before’, something that is not given 
‘even as an object of cognition’.20 This conception of freedom, which depends 
upon man’s faculty to begin something new, reflects the centrality of the event of 
‘natality’ for the human condition. ‘The new beginning inherent in birth,’ Arendt 
notes, ‘can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the 
capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting,’ and in so doing of 
performing the unexpected and even the ‘infinitely improbable’.21 It is only in the 
course of acting and speaking in the public realm that men reveal this potential to 
                                                     
19 ibid, 145. 
20 ibid, 150. 
21 Arendt, n 10 above, 9, 178. Natality, she adds, ‘may be the central category of […] political thought [...] 
Of the three aspects of the vita activa, action has the closest connection with the human condition of 
natality’.  
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the world by revealing who they are, exercising their freedom by disclosing their 
‘unique personal identities’.22  
Political freedom, which must transcend both our motives and our intended 
goals, is not, as the analogy with the unexpected might suggest, wholly arbitrary.23  
It springs from what Arendt somewhat enigmatically calls ‘principle’, and as she 
will later note in reference to the new beginning that is the American revolution, 
‘beginning’ and ‘principle’ have the same etymological root. Principle, in contrast 
to the judgment of the intellect and to the command of the will, is fully manifested 
only in action itself. But whatever the nature of the principle that inspires action – 
whether it is the love of equality, which Montesquieu called virtue, or fear and 
distrust – it is only in action that men can experience freedom and only through 
action with others that political power is generated.24 
This experience of action in the public realm, whether it is the creation and 
maintenance of political and social institutions or the promises that men make to 
each other in their daily lives, has no independent life outside of the continued 
conservation of those institutions or promises by those through whose action they 
were constituted and might be maintained.25 Although it is, to be sure, both 
unpredictable in nature and fragile in its existence, the idea of political freedom, 
which can be resurrected from our neglected traditions and historical experiences, 
still looms large in our imagination. Despite the apparent triumph of modern 
liberalism and the fear of any alternatives inculcated by the experience of 
totalitarianism in the 20th century, we still hold out for this more demanding sense 
of freedom and the juridical consciousness that accompanies it. If the culmination 
of the great tradition of philosophy is the suggestion that freedom is only 
experienced in isolated contemplation or the pursuit of individual interests, then 
the episodes of modern revolution call into question such received wisdom as well 
as the traditional understanding of law which accompanies it.  
 
 
 
ESCAPE FROM THE TRADITION: 
POLITICAL FREEDOM IN THE MODERN REVOLUTIONARY 
IMAGINATION 
 
The modern conception of revolution, inextricably bound up with the 
notion that the course of history suddenly begins anew, that an entirely 
                                                     
22 ibid, 179. ‘It is in the nature of beginning that something new is started which cannot be expected from 
whatever may have happened before. This character of startling unexpectedness is inherent in all 
beginnings and in all origins […] The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be 
expected from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable’. ibid, 177-178. 
23 Arendt stresses that she is not suggesting the rightness or wrongness of our goals are unimportant – 
only that such questions are ones of judgment, which precedes the will, and not of freedom. 
24 Arendt, n 3 above, 151. 
25 The analogy apposite to the exercise of political freedom is not the activity of work and the product of 
making, eg of a work of art, or a novel, but of spontaneous and improvised performance in concert with 
others, expressed in word and deed and arising ‘in between’ men. ibid, 153.  
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new story, a story never known or told before, is about to unfold, was 
unknown prior to the two great revolutions at the end of the eighteenth 
century.26  
  
The French and American revolutions bring us closer to this conception of 
political freedom as it makes its appearance (or reappearance)27 in the world and in 
doing so reveal its implications for our juridical consciousness. But it bears 
reiteration that the period from the late eighteenth century up to the middle of the 
‘American century’ in which Arendt was writing are those of the triumph of a 
liberal worldview in which ‘negative liberty’ looms large, and ‘political freedom’ 
has largely disappeared. These revolutionary events that Arendt recovers therefore 
present us with something of the exceptional.28 And yet although political freedom 
as experienced in the course of modern revolutions is in tension with the liberal 
tradition as well as the Christian tradition and the great tradition of Philosophy 
which preceded it,29 at the same time it appears (in hindsight) to be an inevitable 
part of our modern juridical consciousness manifested most apparently in the 
concept of constituent power: ‘we, the people’ are the foundations of the modern 
constitutional settlement. The recovery of political freedom therefore trades both 
on the exceptionality of the revolutionary moment and on its unavoidability in 
hindsight; it remains with us in the way we conceive of constitutionalism in 
modernity – namely in accordance with an ideology of popular sovereignty, 
irrespective of the extent to which it is fulfilled or betrayed in practice.  
‘Crucial to any understanding of revolutions in the modern age,’ Arendt 
suggests, ‘is that the idea of freedom and the experience of a new beginning 
should coincide.’30 Unique about modern revolution is that freedom is conceived 
not as a mental category of thought, judgment, and will, but as a category of action 
and, furthermore, in a manner that supersedes the weak sense of mere ‘liberation’ 
from the oppression of the ancien régime and the constraints of the traditions that it 
embodied. It emerges in the strong sense of revealing our constitutional potentia, 
the capacity to create a ‘new beginning’ for political freedom, as well as institutions 
to preserve a space in which freedom can be exercised for posterity (freedom as 
the experience of the ‘We can’ rather than the ‘I will’).31 Of the self-conception of 
the American founders, the record of the American Revolution speaks an entirely 
                                                     
26 Arendt, n 2 above, 28. 
27 Little here turns on whether the break itself is absolute, in the sense of utterly unprecedented. Arendt 
elsewhere suggests the revolutionaries are attempting to recover something lost: See n 3 above, 140.  
28 This is sometimes missed when focusing on the text of On Revolution, Arendt, n 2 above. Arendt’s 
pessimism is presented more starkly in The Human Condition, n 10 above, and The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(USA: Harcourt, Inc., 1966).  
29 Arendt argues that the Christian rejection of politics is even more radical than the Platonic one because 
the idea of a public space is intolerable in Christianity. n 11 above, 135-138. 
30 Arendt, n 2 above, 29. 
31 Arendt contrasts freedom as the ‘I will’ with the freedom as the ‘I can’. n 3 above, 157-161. But since 
political freedom is experienced in concert with others, the notion of the ‘We can’ presents a more 
apposite contrast.  
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clear, unambiguous language: it was not constitutionalism in the sense of ‘limited’, 
lawful government that preoccupied their minds.32 The main question for them, 
‘was not how to limit power but how to establish it, not how to limit government 
but how to found a new one’.33  
 
Freedom needed, in addition to mere liberation, the company of other men 
who were in the same state, and it needed a common public space to meet 
them – a politically organised world, in other words, into which each of the 
free men could insert himself by word and deed.34  
 
To capture the modernity of revolution is to capture the sense that more than 
merely liberation (from monarchy, despotism, or oppression) is at stake, which 
generally trades on a negative conception of liberty as freedom from interference 
or domination. The constitution of political freedom is at stake, and this requires 
the establishment of political equality among citizens in a republic who are 
responsible for their own laws. In other words, it is about experiencing and 
constituting the freedom to govern in concert with others rather than the freedom from 
oppressive government by those in power. The revolutions thereby arouse 
passions that have been dormant for man outside of classical antiquity, absent in 
the centuries between the fall of the Roman Empire and the beginning of the 
modern age. Of the sheer extraordinariness of this experience, the startling 
recognition of man’s capacity for beginning anew, Arendt is in little doubt. It is at 
the root of the enormous pathos we find in both the American and the French 
‘revolutionary spirit’, a spirit which consists, she says, in ‘the eagerness to liberate 
and to build a new house where freedom can dwell’, and is ‘unprecedented and 
unequalled in all prior history’.35  
The event of modern revolution connects political freedom to a legal-
theoretical enquiry with the emergence of this constitutional potentia, an idea with 
real juridical significance because it suggests the ultimate foundations of 
constitutional authority lie with the collective power of the people to constitute 
their own basic laws. From a juridical perspective, whilst the original political 
meaning of the revolutions, was, as Arendt explains, that of demanding a return to 
the limited government of the past – the restoration of ancient liberties that had 
been slowly eroded by the monarchies in England and France – the outcome was 
far more radical, leading spectacularly to a whole new social imaginary, based on 
constituent power and popular sovereignty.36  
It is not only that limiting government – in terms of securing guarantees 
against it, such as those found in a Bill of Rights, including rights of representation 
                                                     
32 Arendt, n 2 above, 147. 
33 ibid, 148. 
34 Arendt, n 3 above, 147. 
35 Arendt, n 2 above, 35. Italics added. But see n 28 above. 
36 On popular sovereignty as an aspect of the modern social imaginary, see C. Taylor, Modern Social 
Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 
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and voting – was historically nothing new; it is that such a conception of the 
constitution suggests political freedom is about procuring safeguards against 
government, when in truth it is about claiming a share in government.37 The 
difference is captured in the observation that although the idea had already 
developed that the people might rebel against a particularly despotic ruler, there 
was simply no way of describing ‘a change so radical that subjects became rulers 
themselves’.38  
The turn towards understanding the constitution as an act of collective law-
making rather than merely of liberation from the tyrannical laws made by others is 
irrevocably tied to the period of modern revolution. Wherever we locate the 
beginning of modern political thought, with Locke or Hobbes, Bodin or 
Machiavelli, the awareness that a new beginning could actually occur in historical 
time as a political phenomenon, that it could be, in Arendt’s words, ‘the result of what 
men had done and what they could consciously set out to do’, emerges only in the 
course of the late eighteenth century revolutions.39 Figures in the great tradition 
such as Hobbes and Locke might have been revolutionary theorists, in the sense 
of questioning dogmatic assumptions about the nature of authority and the activity 
of political philosophy, but they were emphatically not theorists of revolution. The 
strange pathos of novelty, ‘so characteristic of the modern age’, Arendt remarks, 
‘needed almost two hundred years to leave the relative seclusion of scientific and 
philosophic thought and to reach the realm of politics’.40 
To be sure, we could view the revolutionary practice of the late 18th century 
as presenting less of a radical break and more of a continuity with the earlier 17th 
century ideas of social contract, which liberated political philosophy from its 
theological straightjacket in its search for scientific or quasi-scientific foundations 
for authority.41 In the process of historical excavation, we could aim our sights 
back further still in the search for the decisive break from the traditionalism of the 
Middle Ages. According to Herman Heller, the ‘immanence conception’ of a 
pouvoir constituant that is actually capable of action, ‘which no longer shares the 
belief in the politically constitutive power of a transcendent God, but believes only 
                                                     
37 Arendt, n 2 above, 143. As Arendt puts it, ‘if no more had ever been at stake in the revolutions than 
this kind of constitutionalism, [‘the liberties which the laws of constitutional government guarantee and 
are all of a negative character’ ibid], it would be as though the revolutions has remained true to their 
modest beginnings when they could be understood as attempts at restoration of ancient liberties: the 
truth of the matter, however, is that this was not the case’. ibid, 143-144. 
38 ibid, 41. A constitution, in Paine’s terms, is the act of a people constituting a government, not the act 
of government itself. Quoted by Arendt herself, ibid, 145. 
39 ibid, 46. 
40 ibid. 
41 Hobbes had compared his endeavour to Euclidian geometry. In the words of Ernst Cassirer, ‘the 
American Declaration of Independence had been preceded by an even greater event: by the intellectual 
Declarations that we find in the theoreticians of the seventeenth century.’ It was there that ‘reason had 
first declared its power […] its claim to rule the social life of man [and] emancipated itself from the 
guardianship of theological thought’. In E. Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1946), 167. 
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in the populas, the universitas civium’ emerges as early as Marsilius of Padua in the late 
Middle Ages.42 
But intellectual history is not our prime concern. It is only when the 
phenomenon of revolution makes its actual appearance in the world that newness is 
no longer considered merely the ‘gift of Providence’ but is ‘endowed with a reality 
peculiar to the political realm’.43 The historical examples of revolution – whether it 
is the American or the French, the later experience of the Paris Commune of 
1871, the creation of Soviets during the Russian revolution, the French Resistance 
during World War II, or the Hungarian revolt in 1956 – show that individual men 
and women could ‘step forward from their private lives in order to create a public 
space where freedom could appear’. In doing so, it is claimed, ‘they rediscovered 
the truth known to the ancient Greeks that action is the supreme blessing of 
human life’.44 ‘Only in such revolutions’, Arendt notes, ‘was there a direct link 
between the idea of participating in government and the idea of being free.’45 
Once political action is perceived as a phenomenon capable of jurisgenesis or 
what might be called constitutio-genesis, the foundations of an immanent and 
mundane ‘authorising authority’ are firmly laid; our constitutional potentia is laid 
bare. The Arendtian notion of potentia is conceived ‘neither as a potential for 
asserting one’s own interests or for realizing collective goals, nor as the 
administrative power to implement collectively binding decisions, but rather as an 
authorising force expressed in “jurisgenesis” – the creation of legitimate law – and 
in the founding of institutions’.46 Since power for Arendt, unlike violence, is 
always the power to act in concert with others, potentia is an inherently collective 
notion. Never ‘the property of an individual’ or merely instrumental to another 
goal, political power necessarily ‘belongs to a group and remains in existence only 
so long as the group keeps together’.47 
The revolutionary notion of a ‘new constitutional beginning’ is, however 
indirectly, a juridical phenomenon because it expresses the idea that ultimately we 
are the authors of our own laws. Habermas will later develop this insight into a 
fully-fledged discourse theory of law and democracy. But for Arendt, and not for 
Habermas, this promise of political freedom, which can be glimpsed in those 
moments of revolutionary action, is ultimately betrayed in the course of the 
modern age.48 We need not get embroiled in the more general pathologies of 
modernity, however, because Arendt presents us with one quite straightforward 
and immediate reason for the failure of the constitutional potentia, namely the 
                                                     
42 H. Heller, Staatslehre, D. Dyzenhaus (trans) (1996) 3 Cardozo Law Review 1139, 1215.  
43 Arendt, n 2 above, 46.  
44 D’Entreves, n 7 above, 68. 
45 Arendt, The Promise of Politics, n 11 above, 142-143.  
46 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge Mass.: MIT, 1996), 148. He continues:  ‘It manifests 
itself […] above all in the freedom-founding acts that bring new institutions and laws “into existence”’.  
148. 
47 H. Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, 1969), 44.  
48 Habermas’s re-appropriation of ‘communicative power’ attempts to overcome the deeply pessimistic 
tone in Arendt’s assessment that praxis has been undermined, first by homo faber, and then by animal 
labourans in the course of the modern age. 
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persistence of the ‘absolute’ in our juridical imagination, due to the perceived need 
for extra-human foundations to serve as a guarantee for the new constitutional 
settlement. This need for an absolute is reflected in two ways: the persistence of a 
traditional conception of law as command and an image of the constitution as a 
fabricated object. From this perspective, the idea of a revolutionary ‘new beginning’ 
presents less of a novel and tremendous possibility, than a familiar and perplexing 
problem,49 to square the circle of legitimacy of the new power and the legality of 
the new laws. In the realm of ideas, and in particular those which inform our 
conceptions of law, the revolutionaries on both sides of the Atlantic remained tied 
to the juridical tradition of the past and to the political ‘unfreedom’ that it entailed. 
It is the purpose of the next part to explain how.  
 
 
 
THE BURDEN OF ‘THE TRADITION’: 
THE PERSISTENCE OF THE ABSOLUTE IN THE JURIDICAL 
IMAGINATION 
 
Commentators frequently criticise Arendt for unduly favouring the US 
revolutionary tradition over its French counterpart, for exaggerating in her praise 
of the ‘political’ revolution in the New World and in her condemnation of the 
‘social’ revolution in the Old.50 The relative success of the US revolution is partly 
reduced by Arendt to a simple comparison of material conditions, the blunt fact, 
as she saw it, that ‘the predicament of poverty was absent from the American 
scene’.51 Arendt’s claim that political freedom is undermined if contaminated by 
the social question has received a great deal of criticism,52 but it can be bracketed 
here, because in juridical terms the burden of the tradition weighs as heavily on 
both revolutionary experiences. This similarity between the New and Old world 
revolutions is often overlooked in the push to highlight their differences, which 
were not only material. Thus in historical terms, whereas the French revolution 
took place against a backdrop of monarchical absolutism, the American 
revolutionaries already had the experience of limited government – the 
constitutionally limited king of the English constitution – on which to draw. Quite 
simply, as Arendt put it, ‘the more absolute the ruler, the more absolute the 
                                                     
49 The modern revolutions, Arendt clarifies, are ‘the only political events which confront us directly and 
inevitably with the problem of beginning’. n 2 above, 21. 
50 See eg W.E. Scheuerman ‘Revolutions and Constitutions: Hannah Arendt’s Challenge to Carl Schmitt’ 
(1997) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 141. Arendt herself says that ‘nothing could be less fair 
than to take the success of the American Revolution for granted and to sit in judgment over the failure of 
the men of the French Revolution’. n 2 above, 68.  
51 Arendt, ibid, 68. 
52 For an outstanding example, see S. Wolin, ‘Democracy and the Political’ in L.P. Hinchman and S.K. 
Hinchman (eds), Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays (New York: SUNY, 1994), 289, focusing on the absence of 
any sustained reflection on social power and social justice in Arendt’s work.   
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revolution will be which replaces him’.53 The men of the US revolution avoided 
the pitfalls not only of an essentialist nationalism, but also of any assumption that 
power and law are unitary, stemming from a single indivisible source, which was 
the ‘fateful blunder of the men of the French revolution’.54 The source of power 
and authority were institutionally separated from the outset in the US, with power 
vested in ‘the people’ and authority embodied in the constitution and exercised for 
posterity by the Supreme Court and the Senate.55  
In contrast to the disorganised yet relatively homogenous multitude in 
France, the US already enjoyed constituted yet diverse pouvoirs constituants in the 
form of the self-governing bodies that preceded the Federal Constitution. Because 
the Declaration of Independence followed constitution-making in all of the 
thirteen colonies, the doctrine of popular sovereignty could emerge without 
‘unleashing the boundless violence of the multitudes’.56 The phenomenon of 
political action, as well as the distinction between power and violence, was already 
known to the Founders.57 The social contract had actually been practised at a 
horizontal level in the form of real covenants, alliances, and mutual promises (such 
as the Mayflower pacts) rather than merely theorised hypothetically as the 
hierarchical surrender to a Hobbesian Leviathan.  
And yet although the American Revolution represents a certain success 
relative to the French, Arendt laments its ‘loss of the revolutionary treasure’, the 
failure to institutionalise political freedom, so that, in conformity with Jefferson’s 
wishes, each generation might enjoy the exhilarating experience of founding anew 
the constitution. Blighting the efforts of the founders from the outset – despite their 
having almost miraculously stumbled upon a way out of the revolutionary impasse 
and of avoiding the dangers of absolutism that so beset the French  – was a failure 
of the juridical imagination common to both revolutionary traditions and of a 
different order than any material or institutional contrasts would suggest. So even 
the American revolution, which was not burdened either with political or 
nationalistic absolutism, or with desperate poverty, still was burdened by the 
philosophical-political need for an absolute; it ‘still occurred within a tradition that 
was partly founded on an event in which the “word had become flesh”, that is, on 
an absolute that had appeared in historical time as a mundane reality’.58 That the 
need for a transcendent, transmundane source of religious or quasi-religious 
sanction to ground the new constitutional foundation persisted in the US showed 
that ‘the problem of an absolute is bound to appear in a revolution’. Indeed, that 
such is the case, ‘we might never have known without the American revolution’, 
since in other respects it distinguished itself so clearly from the predicament of the 
Old World.  
                                                     
53 Arendt, n 2 above, 155. 
54 ibid, 165. 
55 The Supreme Court, Arendt notes, citing Woodrow Wilson, exists as a kind of ‘Constitutional 
Assembly in continuous session’. ibid, 200. 
56 ibid, 166, 182. 
57 ibid, 181. 
58 ibid, 160. 
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The revolutions on both sides of the Atlantic faced the task of establishing a 
new authority, ‘unaided by custom and precedent and the halo of immemorial 
time’.59 The absolute was thus invoked to break the two ‘vicious circles’ of the 
legality of the new source of law, and the legitimacy of the new source of power. 
Sieyes ‘solved’ this problem by drawing his famous distinction between pouvoir 
constituant and pouvoir constitué, placing the pouvoir constituant in a perpetual state of 
nature and anchoring power and law in the will of the nation, ‘which remained 
outside and above all government and all laws’.60  
But substituting natural law with the mythical will of the nation, which for 
Arendt is ‘the cheapest and most dangerous disguise the absolute ever assumed in 
the political realm’, was no genuine solution at all to the vexed problem of 
foundations. Besides the nation being a ‘dangerous’ and ‘cheap’ substitute for 
popular sovereignty (rather than a genuine expression thereof), there is a problem 
of future stability for the new republic. Since the will of the ‘multitude’ is transient 
almost by definition, ‘a structure built on it as its foundation is built on 
quicksand’.61 This state of endless fluidity enabled the authoritarian manipulation 
of the idea of the national will, leading to Napoleon Bonaparte being able to 
declare: ‘Je suis le pouvoir constituant!’ So the appeal to a quasi-metaphysical 
nationalism seems to be caught between two poles: it is inauthentic and imposed 
from the top-down (an ‘invented’ tradition), or it is a genuine reflection of the 
political and social reality on the ground, but, and therefore, it is inherently 
unstable.  
The US was not ready to ‘invent’ its nationalism, and it thus avoided that 
particular temptation that beset the French. And yet despite having serendipitously 
stumbled upon the path to avoiding ‘the absolute’ – the very act of founding itself 
– the Americans ultimately failed, like their French counterparts, to preserve the 
new constitutional potentia. According to Arendt, we cannot divorce this failure 
from the problem of ‘the absolute’, which persisted due to the second vicious 
circle of the legality of the new laws of the republic. The New World 
revolutionaries remained plagued by the need for a ground for law that would 
serve as an authority for the new constitution, the need, as it might be described, 
for an ‘Immortal Legislator’.  
  
[T]he very task of laying down a new law of the land, which was to 
incorporate for future generations the “higher law” that bestows validity on 
all man-made laws, brought to the fore, in America no less than France, the 
need for an absolute.62 
                                                     
59 ibid, 160. 
60 ibid, 163. As Sieyes puts it in his revolutionary pamphlet, ‘What is the Third Estate?’, ‘the nation is 
prior to everything. It is the source of everything. Its will is always legal; indeed it is the law itself’. In E. 
Sieyes, Political Writings , M. Sonenscher (trans) (Indianapolis: Hacket Pub. Co., 2003), 136. 
61 Arendt, n 2 above, 163. 
62 ibid, 182. 
  
Michael A. Wilkinson                                         Between Freedom and Law  
 
 15 
 
Although this problem did not lead the men of the American Revolution ‘into the 
same absurdities’ as it did the French, it nevertheless betrayed the promise of 
political freedom. In the American no less than the French revolutionary mind, to 
square the circle of the legality of the new laws, to put the ‘law above men’, as 
Rousseau puts it, il faudrait des Dieux.63 That the need to base their claims on 
foundations external to and independent of mere assertion or opinion continued 
to haunt the men of the American Revolution and infect their own ideas is 
evidenced by their appeal to ‘self-evident’ truths in the Declaration, an alternative, 
but equally ideological, absolute to Divine Right. The declaration that ‘we hold 
these truths to be self-evident’, combines the relative, ‘an agreement between those 
who have embarked on revolution’ and the absolute, ‘a truth that needs no 
agreement since, because of its self-evidence, it compels without argumentative 
demonstration of political persuasion’.64 
This need for absolute foundations for basic laws infected the Enlightenment 
mind more generally, whether in the form of Rousseau’s theological lament or 
Kant’s sardonic quips that man is an ‘animal that needs a master’ and that one 
‘ought to obey God rather than men’.65 Modern constitutionalism reflects the 
‘Platonism of modern natural law’, the Constitution becomes the new God to 
worship or the new myth to behold, and the revolutionary treasure of political 
freedom is lost in the constitutionally frozen republic. 
And yet the insight that Arendt’s work on revolution brings to bear is that 
this reflects a problem ‘inherent’ in the traditional conception of law.66 The legacy 
bestowed by the tradition was an image of law based on command by a superior 
and obedience by a subject, Hebrew in origin, and represented by the Divine 
Commandments of the Decalogue.67 ‘Only to the extent that we understand by 
law a commandment by which men owe obedience regardless of their consent and 
mutual agreements,’ Arendt argues, ‘does the law require a transcendent source of 
authority for its validity, that is, an origin which must be beyond human power.’68 
                                                     
63 ibid, 184. 
64 ibid, 192. ‘The authority of self-evident truth may be less powerful than the authority of an “avenging 
God”, but it certainly still bears clear signs of divine origin; such truths are, as Jefferson wrote in the 
original draft of the Declaration of Independence, “sacred and undeniable”.’ ibid, 194. 
65 Kant was famously ambiguous about the course of the French Revolution, maintaining a preference 
for the republican over the democratic form of government (democracy for Kant is despotism), because 
only with the former the ruler ‘will reflect that he has taken over an office which is too great for a human 
being, namely that of administering God’s most sacred institution of earth, the rights of man’. In H. Reiss 
(ed), Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), 103. Although beginning from the moral principle 
of autonomy, the realities of the political realm are of a republican sovereign determining the general will 
on our behalf. Kant is ultimately unable to believe in democratic constitution-making because of his faith 
that ‘we ought to obey God rather than men’. fn 1, 31. The central conviction of constitutionalism, 
Friedrich later argues, has a religious foundation; it reflects the notion of ‘a divine justice that transcends 
the human understanding’. C.J. Friedrich, Philosophy of Law in a Historical Perspective (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1958), 19. 
66 Arendt, n 2 above, 195. Only Montesquieu manages to break from the ‘tradition’ of legal absolutism; 
see below. 
67 ibid, 189. 
68 ibid. 
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Because of the apparent ‘arbitrariness’ of the new beginning – after the 
revolutionary hiatus between a ‘no-longer’ and a ‘not yet’ – it seemed natural to 
seek for ‘an absolute’ as a foundation for the new republic. The problem of the 
beginning, notes Arendt, ‘appears first in thought and speculation about the origin 
of the universe’, and the Hebrew solution for its perplexities was ‘the assumption 
of a Creator God who is outside his own creation in the same way as the 
fabricator is outside the fabricated object’.69 The notion of the Sovereign being at 
the origin and outside of the ‘fabricated’ (or positive) law survives in Austin’s 
theory of law as the command of the sovereign and reaches its apogee in Carl 
Schmitt’s theory of the Sovereign as he who decides on the exception.70 
This imperative view of law is built upon the tradition’s fundamental 
misconception of freedom as the arbitrary exercise of individual will. With the 
association of law as a command of the will – the very essence of the ‘will’ is to 
command and be obeyed, Arendt notes, – the notion of sovereignty continues to 
dominate our modern juristic imagination, whether it is the sovereignty of the 
ruler (as in the ideology of ‘popular sovereignty’) or the sovereignty of a rule or set 
of rules (as in the expression the ‘sovereignty of the constitution’). According to 
Arendt, this notion of sovereignty and its accompanying conception of rule are 
designed to avoid the uncertainties of political action in the conditions of human 
plurality. They mark the desire to escape from politics, and therefore from 
freedom, altogether. The ‘hallmark’ of all such escapes from politics is, says 
Arendt, ‘the concept of rule’, because it implies ‘that men can lawfully and 
politically live together only when some are entitled to command and others 
forced to obey.’71 The commonplace notion that political community is necessarily 
constituted in this dualistic fashion rests on a suspicion of action and the wish for it 
to be displaced. 
From a juridical perspective, the persistence of the ‘absolute’ is linked to the 
image of man as homo faber, in the sense of being a law – or constitution-maker, 
because it is a reflection of the theological image of ‘God the creator’. Rules are 
‘fabricated’ in advance in accordance with a preconceived ‘idea’ (the result of 
‘contemplation’) and in order to present firm boundaries to political action and 
limit the contingencies of human affairs.72 Once a substitute for action is found, 
politics then becomes mere administrative execution, analogous to the private 
economic decisions of the household, a substitution that, we will now see, is not 
distinctively modern, but takes its cue from the Platonic inauguration of the ‘great 
                                                     
69 ibid, 206. 
70 For Schmitt, the sovereign decision is an ‘absolute beginning’, because ‘it springs from normative 
nothingness and a concrete disorder’. A. Kalyvas, ‘Who’s Afraid of Carl Schmitt?’ (1999) 25(5) Philosophy 
and Social Criticism 87, 97. Kalyvas explains that the idea of a creation ex nihilo is a legacy of Schmitt’s 
political theology, the analogy is the divine power which can create an order to which it is not itself 
subject just as the constitution cannot absorb the constituent subject, the people. See A. Kalyvas ‘Carl 
Schmitt and the Three Moments of Democracy’ (2000) 21 Cardozo Law Review 1542. 
71 Arendt, n 10 above, 222. 
72 ibid. 
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tradition’. That the essential characteristic of all authoritarian government is a 
source of authority ‘beyond the sphere of power’ and, like the law of nature or the 
commands of God, not itself ‘man-made,’ goes right back to Plato’s political 
philosophy.’73 
 
 
 
THE LIBERATION OF THE TRADITION: 
THE EMERGENCE OF HOMO FABER FROM MODERN 
REVOLUTION 
 
In modern terms, it is said, ‘constitution’ actually means the ‘active making of a 
new order, as opposed to its gradual emergence in the course of a continual 
historical development’; it involves ‘the idea of an authority and an author whose 
willpower is the ultimate cause of the polity’.74 So the modern mind was not only 
unable to escape the traditional conception of law; it strengthened the prejudice 
against political action by idolising constitution-making or constitutional authorship 
(as well as by turning towards a Darwinian assessment of domination as an aspect 
of our supposedly ‘natural’ instincts of command and obedience).75 
In some respects, it is no surprise that fabrication rather than action, 
constitution-making rather than political freedom, comes to dominate the juridical 
imagination. The idea emerges in modernity that even newness itself can be ‘man-
made’, with the revolutionary beginnings of the autonomy of the political 
coinciding with the emerging consciousness that man can make his own history.76 It 
is then a short step to conceiving man’s ability to make his own laws, a precursor, 
in later modernity, and even more spectacularly, as Arendt puts it, to his ability to 
make ‘nature’, culminating with his potential escape from the physical and social-
psychological confines of the earth itself.77  
Constitution-making becomes something of an obsession in modernity, with 
the commonplace metaphor that constitution-makers are the ‘architects’ of a pre-
political artifice, making constitutions like ‘puddings to a recipe’. The escape from 
politics suggested by the traditional conception of law as command is thus 
                                                     
73 Arendt, n 3 above, 110. 
74 U. Preuss, ‘Constitutional Power-Making for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the Relations 
Between the Constituent Power and the Constitution’ (1993) 14 Cardozo Law Review 639. 
75 Arendt’s critique of fabrication extends to authorship. ‘Neither the individual life story nor the 
mundane social reality of historical events have an identifiable author, action being entangled in the web 
of human relationships. Real stories, in distinction from those we invent, have no author.’ Arendt, n 10 
above, 185. 
76 Loughlin connects this process to the birth of modern public law: ‘The era of religion thus comes to a 
close only when law is acknowledged to be a human construct, devised by humans according to their own 
self-defined purposes. Only under conditions of secularisation and positivisation is the medieval idea of 
fundamental law transformed into the modern discipline of public law.’ n 5 above, 7.  
77 The Human Condition, n 10 above, begins with the space race, the ‘first step towards escape from men’s 
imprisonment to the earth’. 1. According to Arendt, it is Hobbes who introduces the new concepts of 
‘making’ into political philosophy, evident in his metaphor of that ‘artificial man’ who is the ‘Great 
Leviathan’. ibid, 300. 
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accompanied by the rise of homo faber ‘from the great revolution of modernity’, the 
burden of the tradition compounded with the anti-political substitution of making 
for acting. This paradigmatically modern notion of constitutional design has come 
under sustained attack by those for whom it represents the top-down imposition 
of a planned order rather than the recognition of the customs or conventions of a 
relatively homogenous community that evolves gradually through time.78 
And yet Arendt’s critique of constitution-making depends not upon any 
relatively homogeneous community or communal identity, but, conversely, upon 
the plurality of men that characterises the human condition. For Arendt, to state it 
bluntly, making is not equivalent to acting, and fabrication does not amount to the 
exercise of political freedom. On the contrary, the rise of homo faber takes place at 
the expense of political freedom; it is because of the fundamental condition of 
plurality on which politics is based that homo faber, implying the idea of one man 
making something out of other men, is an anti-political category. And Arendt’s 
critique is radical because she deems the idealisation of fabrication to have been 
set implicitly in motion by the Platonic inauguration of the great tradition, and 
only liberated, but not fundamentally transformed, by the modern worldview.  
So although modern constitutionalism is in danger of suppressing political 
action, ‘the modern age […] was not the first to denounce the idle uselessness of 
action and speech in particular and of politics in general’. Exasperation with 
political action – its unpredictability, irreversibility, and anonymity – is in fact 
‘almost as old as recorded history’.79 It reflects Plato’s foundational hierarchy of 
the vita contemplativa over the vita activa – the priority of philosophy over politics,80 a 
story which begins with the Platonic identification of the division between thought 
and action ‘with the gulf that separates rulers from those over whom they rule’. 
Although the basis for this separation is the experience of the household and the 
master-slave relationship,81 it plays ‘its most decisive part in the organisation of 
public matters’ and becomes intimately connected with our understanding of 
politics.82 In the master-slave relationship, there is a clear separation between 
                                                     
78 Charles Taylor, for example, expresses this criticism in his work on Hegel: ‘The idea of just designing a 
constitution and then putting it into practice is an Enlightenment idea. It treats the whole affair as an 
engineering problem, an external matter of means and design. But a constitution requires certain 
conditions in men’s identity, how they understand self; and hence this enlightenment idea is radically 
shallow. To try in philosophy to transcend one’s age is like trying to jump over Rhodes.’ Hegel 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1975), 421.  
79 Arendt, n 10 above, 220. Italics added. The difference between action and fabrication is given explicit 
articulation by Aristotle in his Nichomachian ethics: ‘doing and making are generically different, since 
making aims at an end distinct from the act of making, whereas in doing the end cannot be other than the 
act itself: doing well is itself the end’. Quoted in J. Taminaux, ‘Athens and Rome’ in D. Villa (ed), 
Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), 168.  
80 The hierarchy of action over fabrication ‘had in fact, though not expressly already been overruled in the 
beginnings of political philosophy by the philosophers’ deep-rooted suspicion of politics in general and 
action in particular’. Arendt continues by arguing that for Plato there is an ‘inner affinity’ between 
contemplation and fabrication, theoria and poiesis. Arendt, n 10 above, 301. 
81 ibid, 223. 
82 ibid, 224. 
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contemplation and action: ‘he who knows does not have to do and he who does 
needs no thought or knowledge.’83 And as the philosopher-king commands the 
city, Arendt notes, ‘the soul commands the body and reason commands the 
passions’.84  
This identification of knowledge with command and rule and of action with 
mere obedience and execution was so powerful that it not only ‘overruled all 
earlier articulations in the political realm’, it also ‘became authoritative for the 
whole tradition of political thought’.85 The domination of rulership over action 
was attained and given extended longevity because of the interpretation of ‘rule’ in 
terms of fabrication. Even the key word of Plato’s philosophy, ‘idea’, is taken from 
experiences in the realm of fabrication, from the division between the perception 
of an image of the ‘product-to-be’ and the ‘means’ of making it. According to the 
parable of the cave, it is only in returning to the shadowy company of his fellow 
men that the philosopher needs ‘the idea’ – the true essence of being - for 
guidance, to act as a standard or rule ‘by which to measure […] the varied 
multitude of human deeds and words with the same absolute, “objective” certainty 
with which the craftsman can be guided in making’.86  
Since Plato’s analogies of household life and the private sphere, such as 
master-slave or shepherd-flock, would, when applied to the public sphere, suggest 
the quasi-divine quality of rulership (to distinguish the ruler ‘as sharply from his 
subjects as the slaves are distinguished from the master or the sheep from the 
shepherd’), Plato instead constructs the public space in the image of a fabricated 
object, which ‘carried with it only the implication of ordinary mastership’.87 With 
this image, the concept of the ‘expert’ enters the realm of political action for the 
first time, and the competence of the statesman in human affairs is understood in 
the same sense as that of the ‘carpenter to make furniture or the physician to heal 
the sick’.88  
The substitution of acting for making and the concomitant degradation of 
politics into a means to obtain a ‘higher’ end, whether the safety of the 
philosopher, the salvation of souls, or the modern belief in the ‘progress’ of 
society, is therefore as old as the ‘great tradition’ of philosophy.89 Although only 
the modern worldview defined man as homo faber and finally overcame the 
suspicion of fabrication, this did not constitute a reversal but rather a liberation 
from prejudices which had prevented the tradition ‘from openly declaring that the 
                                                     
83 ibid, 223. 
84 ibid, 224. 
85 ibid, 225. 
86 ibid, 226. 
87 ibid, 227. The analogy of the ‘idea’ that the craftsman has, visualised by his ‘inner eye’ and which 
transcends the product and lies ‘beyond the fabrication process it guides’ suggests that there are ideal 
standards for failure or success. ‘The ideas become the unwavering “absolute” standards for political and 
moral behaviour and judgment in the same sense that the “idea” of a bed in general is the standard for 
making and judging the fitness of all particular manufactured beds.’ Arendt, n 3 above, 110).  
88 Arendt, n 3 above, 111.  
89 Arendt, n 10 above, 229. 
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work of the craftsman should rank higher than the ‘idle’ opinions and actions that 
constitute the public realm’.90 
This displacement of action is associated by Arendt ‘with the whole body of 
argument against democracy’, and, she continues, it is ultimately an argument against 
the essentials of politics itself because it tramples over the human condition of 
plurality, ‘the condition sine qua non for that space of appearance which is the 
public realm’.91 The attempt to do away with this plurality, whether through 
monarchy, tyranny, the benevolent Platonic philosopher-king, or those forms of 
democracy that assume the body politic to constitute an unproblematic unity, ‘is 
always tantamount to the abolition of the public realm’, banishing the citizen to 
the private sphere of personal and material interests. In the Platonic Republic, 
Arendt notes, ‘the philosopher-king applies the ideas as the craftsman applies his 
rules and standards; he “makes” his City as the sculptor makes a statue; and in the 
final Platonic work these same ideas have even become laws which need only be 
executed’.92 Politics then becomes about mastering the techniques of human 
affairs according to a predetermined plan, based on a constitutional blueprint for a 
utopia. In the modern age, this is reflected in our valuing the work of the politician 
as a technician or craftsman, rather than the opinions of those acting and speaking 
with each other in the public realm.93  
 
 
 
CONCEPTUALISING LAW BEYOND ‘THE TRADITION’: 
NOMOS OR LEX? 
 
Was there any alternative to the traditional conception of law, which assumed 
rulers and ruled, sovereign and subject, and an absolute source of authority and 
which retained such a tight grip on the modern juridical consciousness? Was there 
any alternative to the idealisation of the constitution-maker as homo faber at the 
expense of genuine political action and freedom? Arendt insists that there were 
other juridical traditions and experiences on which the revolutionary imagination 
could have drawn: 
 
When the Athenian city-state called its constitution an isonomy, or the 
Romans spoke of the civitas as their form of government, they had in mind a 
concept of power and law whose essence did not rely on the command-
                                                     
90 Plato and, albeit to a lesser degree, Aristotle, who deemed craftsmen not even worthy of full citizenship 
status, nevertheless ‘were the first to propose handling political matters and ruling political bodies in the 
mode of fabrication’. ibid, 230. 
91 ibid, 220. 
92 ibid, 227. 
93 ibid, 229. This turns the evaluation of law and politics into an assessment of means and ends and it 
therefore prefigures the domination of instrumental rationality that Max Weber documented.  
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obedience relationship and which did not identify power and rule or law and 
command.94  
 
Although the revolutionaries of the late 18th century did partly turn to antiquity in 
attempting to construct a new republic that would rest on the principle of the 
consent of the governed, they were ultimately unable to escape the shackles of the 
tradition. They overlooked the potential of two alternative conceptions of law, the 
Greek nomos and the Roman lex, both of which could have mitigated the burden of 
the tradition and its problem of the absolute, which ‘neither Roman nor Greek 
antiquity was ever perplexed by’.95 Neither the Greek nomos nor the Roman lex was 
of divine origin, and neither the Greek nor the Roman concept of legislation 
needed divine inspiration or a legislator who was outside of and above his own 
laws. Although it was true that the Greeks thought the lawgiver could be a 
stranger called from abroad, ‘this meant no more than that the laying down of the 
law was pre-political […] just as building the walls around the city was prior to the 
coming into existence of the city itself’.96 The very word, nomos, which ‘received its 
full meaning as the opposite of […] things that are natural’, stresses the “artificial”, 
conventional and man-made nature of the law’.97 Although the Roman lex was in 
an important sense different from Greek nomos, neither lex nor nomos required a 
transcendent source of authority. 
The metaphor of ‘building the walls around the city’ of course recalls the 
modern category of constitution-making and signals an important difference 
between the twin conceptions of antiquity, which Arendt only hints at in her 
analysis of their influence on the men of the 18th century revolutions. In 
examining the contrast, rather than the similarity, between these two conceptions, 
the Roman lex suggests a path beyond the tradition, albeit one which was not 
ultimately followed, whilst the Greek nomos reveals the pitfalls characteristic of the 
category of fabrication and the idealisation of homo faber.98  
The Roman lex, construed by Arendt as meaning ‘lasting tie’ and eventually 
‘contract’, can be understood as linking human beings together through mutual 
                                                     
94 Arendt, n 47 above, 40. 
95 Arendt insists that John Adams was wrong in claiming that ‘the general opinion of ancient nations’ was 
that ‘the Divinity alone was adequate to the important office of giving laws to men’. n 2 above, 186. 
96 ibid. 
97 ibid. 
98 In the posthumously published ‘Introduction into Politics’, Arendt presents the contrast between nomos 
and lex in a stark fashion. The contrast is introduced after a discussion of the political significance of the 
Trojan war of annihilation, significant not only because of the threat of a contemporary war of 
annihilation in the wake of the Second World War and the bombing of Hiroshima, but because in 
interrogating ‘the solution to the question of war’ Arendt reflects, ‘we might discover the origin of the 
concept of law’. For the Greeks, the ‘grand impartiality’ of Homer’s account of the Trojan war suggested 
the complete exclusion of war and the brute force it entailed ‘from what was truly political’, namely that 
which arose between and belonged to the citizens of the polis. To the Greek way of thinking, she adds, 
‘freedom was rooted in place, bound to one spot and limited in its dimensions and the limits of freedom’s 
space were congruent with the walls of the city, of the polis, or, more precisely, the agora contained 
within it’.  The Promise of Politics, n 11 above, 170. 
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agreements,99 and hence through the faculty of promising, which Arendt gives great 
weight to in ‘The Human Condition’, and claims to have influenced the American 
(as opposed to the French) revolutionaries via the writings of Montesquieu. The 
great variety of contract theories which Roman lex gave birth to ‘attests to the fact 
that the power of making promises has occupied the center of political thought 
over the centuries’.100 We will return to the faculty of promising as central to 
political action in our concluding remarks, but it is important to note that this 
potential is one that is revealed uniquely through the Roman lex, because although 
the Greeks, like the Romans, tied law to the activity of speech that was central to 
all politics, only for the Romans did legislative activity, and the laws themselves, 
belong to the realm of politics. For the Greeks, on the other hand, ‘the legislator’s 
activity was so radically disconnected from the truly political activities and affairs 
of the citizens within the polis that the law-giver did not even have to be a citizen 
of the city’. On the contrary, he could be engaged from outside to perform his 
task, Arendt continues, ‘much like a sculptor or architect commissioned to supply 
what the city required’.101  
Since the Greek concept of nomos is pre-political, it is associated, like the 
activities of Plato’s philosopher-king and modern constitution makers, with an 
isolated and even singular task of contemplation that is followed, like the work of 
‘sculpture’ or ‘architecture’, by a process of fabrication in accordance with a 
preconceived plan: 
 
For the Greeks, law […] is essentially conceived by a law-giver and must first 
exist before it can ever enter into the political realm. As such it is pre-
political, but in the sense that it is constitutive for all further political action 
and interaction. Just as the walls of the city […] must first be built before 
there can be a city identifiable by its shape and borders, the law determines 
the character of its inhabitants [...] The law is a city wall that is instituted and 
erected by one man, inside of which is created the political realm where many 
men move about freely.102 
 
There can be little doubt that Arendt reconstructs this conception of law in order 
to challenge it.103 If reconstructed in the manner of nomos, law is associated with 
precisely those aspects of the human condition that are not merely pre-political 
                                                     
99 ibid, 179. 
100 Arendt, n 10 above, 244. 
101 Arendt, The Promise of Politics, n 11 above, 179. 
102 ibid, 180. See also Arendt, n 2 above, 186-187. Also in Arendt, n 10 above, 194: For the Greeks 
already, ‘the law-maker was like the builder of the city wall, someone who had to do and finish his work 
before political activity could begin’ and was therefore to be treated ‘like any other craftsman or architect’. 
103 More than once, Arendt expresses her allegiance to the Roman notion of lex. After the passage just 
cited, Arendt speaks of the Roman conception as ‘extraordinarily fruitful’. The Promise of Politics, n 11 
above, 180. In Arendt, n 10 above, she speaks of the ‘true genius’ of Rome, and in n 2 above, the ‘great 
Roman model’. 199. On the influence of Roman thought in Arendt, see D. Hammer ‘Hannah Arendt and 
Roman Political Thought’ (2002) 30(1) Political Theory 124. 
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but in an important sense anti-political: violence, singularity, and fabrication as 
opposed to power, plurality, and action. The crucial point, Arendt stresses, is that 
the law in terms of nomos has something violent about it because it comes into 
being ‘by means of production, not of action’. The lawgiver in Greece ‘resembles 
the architect of the city and its builder, not the politikos and citizen’.104 This 
conception of law as an aspect of the human artifice is echoed by modern man’s 
conviction that he ‘can know only what he makes’ and that he is therefore 
primarily homo faber rather than animal rationale. But the apparent necessity and in 
some cases glorification of violence that was particularly striking in the series of 
modern revolutions, Arendt notes, comes with the important ‘exception of the 
American’ revolution.105  
The ‘singularity’ inherent in the category of fabrication and characteristic of 
the Greek conception of law-making did, nevertheless, still have a telling influence 
on the US founders.106 The Platonic understanding of rule, through which ‘the 
many become one in every respect’, is of course reflected in the American 
founding motto, e pluribus unum. It was fear of plurality and of the unpredictability 
and spontaneity of political action (the entanglement in a complex web of human 
relationships that it entails) which had inspired the Greeks to set limits by means of 
nomos and ‘to interpret the law not as a link and a relationship, but rather as an 
enclosing border than no one should overstep’,107 just as a similar fear might be 
thought to underline Madison’s concern as expressed in Federalist Number 10 to 
guard against political factions.  
This assumption that the purpose of constitutional law is to place limits on 
political action is ultimately tied up with the same erroneous and reductive 
conception of politics and of freedom that plagued the traditional conception of 
law as command. So although the Greek conception of nomos does not fall prey to 
the absolutism of the Hebrew-Christian tradition, it does, like command, ultimately 
reflect the same attempt to escape from political freedom, where freedom is 
understood as the ability ‘to call something into being that did not exist before’, to 
bring something new into the world in concert with others and in the context of 
plurality. The upshot of nomos is that freedom is secured by ensuring restraints, 
even if these are understood in modern constitutional language as ‘enabling 
restraints’; in both cases freedom is that which remains after the city wall has been 
                                                     
104 Arendt, The Promise of Politics, n 11 above, 181. For Arendt, the architectural metaphor of fabrication 
always suggests a certain violence; without the violence of the maker, ‘no fabrication could ever come to 
pass’. n 10 above, 228. See also Arendt, The Promise of Politics, n 11 above, 111. 
105 Arendt, n 10 above, 228. Although misleading as a broader historical point, this is conceptually 
significant in that it suggests not only that violence is distinguishable from power but also that it is 
avoidable in constitutional politics. See also Arendt, n 3 above, 140.  
106 Madison, for example, noted that the task of framing the constitution of government has in history 
‘been performed by some individual citizen of pre-eminent wisdom’. In Federalist, no 38, quoted by 
Arendt, n 2 above, 312. The revolutionaries on both sides of the Atlantic were influenced by the 
Machiavellian idea that, ‘to found a new republic must be the work of one man only’. ibid, 207. 
Contributing to the failure of the French case was Robespierre’s self-perception as the ‘architect’ who will 
build out of ‘human material a new house for human beings’. ibid, 208. 
107 Arendt, The Promise of Politics, n 11 above, 186. 
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built. As in the ‘housing’ metaphor that Arendt herself employs, freedom is left to 
‘dwell’ after the house has been constructed rather than exercised in the 
construction (and reconstruction) of the house itself. If freedom is left merely to 
‘dwell’, it might not be long before it dissipates altogether.  
The basic error of the tradition, Arendt notes, lies in its identification of 
freedom with sovereignty, something that ‘has always been taken for granted in 
political as well as philosophic thought’.108  But ‘no man’, Arendt admonishes, ‘can 
be sovereign because not one man, but men, inhabit the earth’;109 sovereignty as 
an idea simply makes no sense in the human condition of plurality. The notion 
that constitutional law is a pre-political construction, presenting a space that ‘houses’ 
(by regulating and limiting) freedom qua personal sovereignty is therefore 
paradoxically a mirror image of the erroneous conception of law as command. It is 
the wholesale rejection of freedom as personal sovereignty – freedom from undue 
interference by others – that suggests the alternative conception of freedom to 
constitute and reconstitute our basic laws. This constitutional potentia suggests not 
only that political freedom is experienced as the exercise of power in common 
with others but also that law and politics are thoroughly and foundationally 
intertwined.  
And yet, ironically, although the founders of the American republic could not 
escape the tradition and fulfil this potentia, they had stumbled on the answer to the 
vicious circle of law’s foundations. The act of engaging with one another through 
promises and mutual ties, reminiscent of the Roman lex, and which constituted the 
‘new beginning’ of the republic, carries its own principle with it. It had, moreover, in 
Montesquieu and his theory of the separation of powers, the only philosopher of 
the Enlightenment who consistently avoided the absolute and the basic conflation 
of freedom and sovereign will.  
 
[A]mong the pre-revolutionary theorists only Montesquieu never thought it 
necessary to introduce an absolute […] into the political realm. This is closely 
connected with the fact that […] only Montesquieu ever used the word ‘law’ 
in its strictly Roman sense […] as the relation subsisting between different 
entities […] Neither religious nor natural laws, therefore, constitute for 
Montesquieu a ‘higher law’, strictly speaking [...] And since, for Montesquieu, 
as for the Romans, a law is merely what relates two things and therefore is 
relative by definition, he needed no absolute source of authority and could 
describes the ‘spirit of the laws’ without ever posing the troublesome 
question of their absolute validity.110 
 
                                                     
108 Arendt, n 10 above, 234. 
109 ibid. 
110 Arendt, n 2 above, 188-189. 
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The contrast with Rousseau is telling.111 Rousseau’s ‘General Will’ is still God-like; 
it is ‘still a divine Will which needs only to will in order to produce a ‘law’’.112 His 
substitution, as Arendt sees it, of consent and opinion with this category of the 
‘will’, ‘essentially excludes all processes of exchange of opinions and an eventual 
agreement between them’.113 For Arendt this speaks of a complete absence of 
freedom: the difference is fundamental, for Arendt, as explained in her critique of 
‘the tradition’, freedom dwells in the ‘We can’, not the ‘I will’ (or even the ‘We 
Will’). Freedom is experienced as the capacity to perform the ‘infinitely 
improbable’, to act in concert with others in the public realm and to bring 
something new into the world. It is expressed politically through the ‘framework 
of ties and bonds, such as laws and constitutions’, which ultimately derive their 
legitimacy ‘from the faculty of promising with one another in the face of the 
essential uncertainties of the future’.114 
 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: 
RECONCILING POLITICAL FREEDOM AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
AUTHORITY? 
 
Does the image of law as lex therefore suggest an alternative path towards the 
reconciliation of political freedom and law, so that we need not confront 
constitutionalism as presenting a fateful ambivalence between them? To be sure, 
lex avoids the image of fabrication and its concomitant suppression of political 
freedom, with its suggestion, as Jeremy Waldron has recently reminded us, of the 
singularity of the constitutional framer – one man making something out of other 
men. It presents instead an image of constitutionalism as political freedom, ‘as an 
activity that arises among men acting and speaking together’.115 An exploration of 
this image will invite further reflection on the tension between the authority of the 
constitution and democratic political freedom.116  
                                                     
111 ‘[J]ust as Montesquieu’s theory of the separation of powers had become axiomatic for American 
political thought […], so Rousseau’s notion of a General Will […] became axiomatic for all factions and 
parties of the French revolution, because it was indeed the theoretical substitute for the sovereign will of 
an absolute monarch.’ ibid, 155. 
112 ibid, 183. 
113 ibid, 76. She continues by criticizing the inherent instability of the General Will, most evident in 
Robespierre’s revolutionary appropriation of Rousseau's idea, but which Rousseau himself concedes with 
his famous line, ‘il est absurde que la volonte se donne des chaines pour l'avenir’. As such the general will is built, 
like Robbespierre's pouvoir constituant, on ‘quicksand’. The very idea of a unity of wills upon which 
Rousseau relies, Arendt says, comes from the basic proposition that two antagonistic wills are united in 
the presence of a third that opposes them both, and thus leads to the presupposition of a common 
national enemy (and of course show us the relatively direct route towards Carl Schmitt). ibid, 78. 
114 Arendt, n 3 above, 162. 
115 J. Waldron, ‘Arendt’s Constitutional Politics’ in Villa, n 79 above, 204. 
116 On the relationship between democracy and the political in Arendt’s work, see S. Wolin, n 52 above. 
He suggests that the ‘antidemocratic strain’, most evident in Arendt’s earlier work, is tempered in her later 
writings as a result of her political experiences in the 1960s.  
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The constitutive activity suggested by lex is conducive to political freedom 
because it is about calling forth something intangible and improbable through the 
joint exercise of power, the mutual pledges and collective acts of promising, on 
the basic principle of pacta sunt servanda. So the tragic irony of the lost revolutionary 
tradition in the US is, for Arendt, that the Founders had actually stumbled across 
the method of avoiding the descent into the absolutism of the tradition, through 
the mutual promises and covenants based in the reciprocal trust of the early 
settlers: this foretold the creation of the political beginning which was to be the 
new republic. The act of foundation could operate as a ‘fountain of authority’, just 
as the word constitution carries a twofold meaning; it is both the act of 
constituting and the result of what is constituted:  
 
The very fact that the men of the American revolution thought of 
themselves as founders indicated the extent to which they must have 
known that it would be the act of foundation itself, rather than an 
Immortal Legislator […] or self-evident truth or any other transcendent 
[…] source, which eventually would become the fountain of authority in 
the new body politic […] It is futile to search for an absolute to break the 
vicious circle in which all beginning is inevitably caught, because this 
absolute lies in the very act of beginning itself.117  
 
The vicious circle of the legality of the new law and the legitimacy of the new 
power is tamed not by positing an absolute, but by developing a principle from the 
act of beginning, which, Arendt notes, for the first time in history occurs in the US 
‘in broad daylight’.118 This event, breaking into the continuous sequence of 
historical time, manifests the constitutional potentia and reveals the possibility of 
political freedom without the absolutism of a creatio ex nihilo. What saves the act of 
beginning from arbitrariness ‘is that it carries its own principle with itself, or to be 
more precise, that beginning and principle are not only related to each other but 
are coeval’.119 The political relevance of these insights, Arendt argues, is that they 
stand in opposition to the claim that violence is necessary for all foundations and 
unavoidable in all revolutions, a claim that she (misleadingly) suggests is refuted by 
the American revolutionary experience.120 What the experience does genuinely 
point to is the possibility of a distinction between the beginning as ‘absolute’ – as 
in the case of fabrication in accordance with a fixed ideal – and the beginning as a 
‘principle’ of joint political action, which is always dynamic, temporal, and 
contingent: 
                                                     
117 Arendt, n 2 above, 205. 
118 When the element of ‘beginning’, which was initially co-joined with the entitlement to rule, 
disappeared from the concept of rulership, ‘the most elementary and authentic understanding of human 
freedom disappeared from philosophy’. Arendt, n 10 above, 224-225. 
119 Arendt, n 2 above, 213. 
120 Arendt, n 10 above, 228. Arendt’s claim is historically dubious, but still conceptually relevant. 
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[A] terminological distinction between the word ‘principium’ (beginning of 
the world) and ‘initium’ (the beginning which is a man), underlin[es] that, 
by contrast with the absolute beginning (principium) that can only be the 
work of God, the human beginning (initium) is always inserted within the 
continuum of time and thus necessarily amounts to a re-beginning.121  
 
And yet what is distinctive about the escape from tradition is not only the novelty 
and exhilaration of political freedom but the fact that the revolutionary events 
‘concern the many and not the few’.122 In this sense, modern revolution is not only 
about freedom but also about equality as a ‘birthright’, which ‘was utterly unknown 
prior to the modern age’.123 Newness, as Arendt puts it, ‘reaches the market place’ 
in the wake of modern revolution.124 It is, in other words, although Arendt fails to 
develop the point, the birth (or rebirth) of democratic political freedom that is 
signalled by the late eighteenth century revolutions. Constitutional potentia must be 
understood as a democratic potentia if it is to remain faithful to the promise of 
modernity.  
Although the revolutionaries still, unhappily, talked about ‘obedience’ to law, 
because of their inability to transcend the tradition, what they meant, according to 
Arendt, was rather the support of the laws through the consent of the citizen. This 
understanding of power based on consent recalls another aspect of Arendt’s 
distinction between power and violence. Whereas violence can manage without 
the many, power always stands in need of numbers.125 After the modern 
democratic revolutions, constitutionalism must therefore stand against the 
Platonic understanding of it as that part of theology which ‘taught the few how to 
rule the many’, as well the liberal understanding of it as a ‘counter-majoritarian’ 
device based on the ‘fear of the many’. It should instead approximate to the Greek 
isonomy (the notion of ‘no-rule’), which conceives equality not on any naturalistic 
basis or self-evident truths, but in virtue of the social and political equality of 
citizenship.126  
But how can ‘the many’ act in concert when it comes to constitutional 
politics? Or, to reverse the question, how can mere ‘consent’ be sufficient for the 
                                                     
121 S. Delacroix, ‘Schmitt on Kelsenian Normativism’ (2005) 18(1) Ratio Juris 40, n 25, paraphrasing from 
H. Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 177 n 3.   
122 See Arendt, n 2 above, 39. 
123 ibid, 40. She continues, ‘Liberation in the revolutionary sense came to mean […] that all those who 
always lived in darkness and subjection to whatever powers there were, should rise and become the 
supreme sovereign of the law.’ The problem is that rather than overcoming the concept of sovereignty 
this suggests that the sovereign had merely been replaced; it was now a popular sovereignty that lay at the 
foundations of the constitution.  
124 ibid, 47. 
125 Arendt, n 47 above, 42. ‘It’s the people’s support that lends power to the institutions of a country, and 
this support is but the continuation of the consent that brought the laws into existence to begin with’. 
ibid, 41. 
126 Arendt, n 2 above, 30-31. Arendt suggests elsewhere that ‘isonomia’ is merely the equal right to speak 
in the polis and that it is a mistake to associate equality with justice, as is the modern inclination.  Arendt, 
The Promise of Politics, n 11 above, 118.  
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generation of political power and expression of political freedom? The choice we 
seem to be faced with is the following: Restrict political freedom to the freedom-
founding actions of those who actually engage in the constitutive activity 
associated with lex, thereby rendering freedom elusive and elitist, sporadic and 
fleeting, or generalise and dilute political freedom and risk that it becomes little 
more than the pallid acquiescence in the structure of constitutional authority.127 A 
similar problem is often reconstructed in constitutional theory with regard to 
future generations: how are they in practice to re-live the mutual constitution of 
the body politic, as Jefferson wished, without descending into chaos, as Madison 
feared?  
There is thus a final dilemma, an examination of which brings us closer to the 
tension between political freedom and law. The lost spirit of revolution seems to 
be the inevitable result of a paradoxical problem of foundations, since it contains 
two elements that appear to be irreconcilable: modern constitutionalism must 
exhibit a concern for both the stability and authority of the new structure and the 
‘exhilarating awareness of the human capacity of beginning’.128 Arendt argues 
persuasively that the institutions of the post-revolutionary era that gave stability to 
the new polity, the Senate and the Supreme Court, and answered the early 
preoccupation with permanence and the ‘augmentation’ of the foundations of the 
republic, were precisely those same institutions which destroyed the spirit of 
revolution itself and undermined the possibility of maintaining political freedom in 
terms of the democratic constitutional potentia of ‘we, the people’. But how, if at 
all, can the political freedom of the many be reconciled with the constitutional 
authority of the few, without reintroducing a problematic foundationalism of 
constitutional origins? 
Although this is a dilemma that Arendt never directly confronts, she does 
suggest an analogy that is more apposite to its resolution than that of ‘fabrication’ 
(or even of ‘promising’). More apt to capture the ‘immanence and plurality’ of 
democratic constitutionalism than the metaphor of building, housing, or erecting 
walls and structures is that of constitutional law as ‘political grammar or syntax’.129 
Rather than suggesting a one-off activity or constitutional moment when the 
‘house’ wherein freedom can dwell is constructed or reconstructed in one go, it 
suggests a dynamic and on-going narrative in the changing circumstances of 
plurality, and in which freedom is negotiated and renegotiated in the public realm.  
Constitutionalism as political grammar represents the idea that even our most 
fundamental law is relational and dynamic, developing symbiotically with politics and 
                                                     
127 In contrast to her assessment of revolutionary political freedom, Arendt suggests that the Greek 
concept of freedom ‘does not require an egalitarian democracy’ but rather ‘a quite narrowly limited 
oligarchy or aristocracy’. Arendt, The Promise of Politics, n 11 above, 118. This tension between a 
revolutionary and an aristocratic sense of freedom is pervasive in Arendt’s work.  
128 J. Cohen and A. Arato argue that this problem is due to Arendt’s failure to draw on the concept of 
civil society as a mediator between law and power: See Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass: 
1992), eg 193. 
129 Waldron, n 115 above, 204. See Arendt, n 2 above, 175.  
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the exercise of political freedom rather than being fabricated or constructed ‘up 
front’ as a timeless container for the vicissitudes of political action.130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
130 As Martin Loughlin has put it, ‘Public law is neither a code of rules or a set of principles but a practice. 
Understood as the law relating to the activity of governing, public law can be defined as that assemblage 
of rules, principles, canons, maxims, customs, usages, and manners that condition, sustain and regulate 
the activity of governing. These practices comprise conventions and rules of speech – a vocabulary and a 
syntax – which are being continually developed.’ The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 155.  
